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
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Editorial

“La rentrée”

Thomas Svolos

There is a wonderful word in French that does not have a direct translation in English—*la rentrée*. This word denotes that period in the year, in September, when kids go back to school, but also, more generally, the return to active life for society as a whole, after the summer break, especially the long August vacation that is a significant part of French life.

I think that one reason that we do not have a word such as this in English is that we do not have an event such as this in American culture. While there were certainly families in the past that would live such a culture—the wife and kids leaving their homes for a few months in the summer to go to a vacation home, with the father joining for weekends periodically—this was largely limited to a small wealthy group here in the US, and is largely a thing of the past with more diverse and complicated family structures and fewer parents without jobs.

The attachment to a certain set of “natural” rhythms such as this—organized around laws, in this case those organized around a seasonal calendar—in the organization of social life is changed, and in the first essay in this latest issue of the *Lacanian Compass*, we present Marie-Hélène Brousse’s reflections on this change—which she has organized around the term of postmodernity, taken from the most recent *Clinical Study Days* held in January in Miami. In her essay, Marie-Hélène Brousse describes a shift from the prior world of the universal and exception to the postmodern world of the multiple, of the possible. But, this is not a world without limits, only a world with new forms of limits, which we see reflected in the different ways in which suffering presents to us in our offices and clinics, a world where paternal injunction is replaced by anxiety, symptoms, and anxiety as the focal points for today’s subjects.

With this issue, we also bring for you Marie-Hélène Brousse’s lecture prior to the *Study Days* on the relationship of art and psychoanalysis, in which—with some very precise references to art—she carefully presents an argument for art as a discourse, in Lacan’s sense of the term—as a form of social bond. She argues that art, like psychoanalysis, interprets. It is the analyst of the unconscious of today and through its created objects, we can learn about today. But, in distinction to the discourse of psychoanalysis, where the object *a* is related to the suffering subject, in art, the object is directly related to knowledge itself.

We also present a special text in this issue—the Testimony of the Pass presented in New York in September of 2007 by Mauricio Tarrab. This presentation, which was also given in Miami that same weekend, marks a first moment in the United States, the first moment when an Analyst of the School has presented a Testimony of an analysis in the United States. His presentations were extremely moving, in both cities, and we are very honored to present here his presentation from New York in English. As we are here in the United States far away from any School of the AMP, it is especially welcome to have had Mauricio Tarrab travel here, as the Pass represents both Lacan’s most definitive answer to how we might formulate the end of an analysis, but is also the most authentic public “evidence” of our work in psychoanalysis, so demanded in our current moment.

We are also glad to bring, in the Log, three reports—bringing to our readers notice of the work of events from outside of the United States. Two are of the most recent Congress of the New Lacanian School this past spring in Athens, which featured the participation of a contingent from the United States, one of whom delivered a paper. We also have a report from the July Encounter of the Freudian Field in Belo Horizonte, also attended by an American contingent, with a number of presentations from the United States.

These reflections and memories from last year are inspiring as we look forward to the coming year at this moment of *la rentrée*.

Beacon

Art, the Avant-Garde and Psychoanalysis

Marie-Hélène Brousse

Miami, FL USA

January 11, 2007

Transcribed by Matthew Schneider

Text established by Gary S. Marshall

Published with the kind authorization of Marie-Hélène Brousse

The title of my presentation is Art, the Avant-Garde and Psychoanalysis. I will develop three points in my talk: (1) the relationship between art and psychoanalysis, (2) art as a discourse in the Lacanian sense of the term, and (3) a conclusion that is grounded in these two core arguments.

First, let us take up the question of art and psychoanalysis. Right from the beginning with Freud, these two spheres have been interwoven; sometimes in conjunction with one another and at other times in contradiction to one another. I will try to simplify the problem by saying that historically speaking, there are two possible positions.

The first and most common position would be that psychoanalysis applies itself to art. That is to say it interprets art and artists. The second position which contradicts the first is that art interprets psychoanalysis. I suggest that both of these positions are derived from Freud because of the degree to which he has written about the relationship art and psychoanalysis. Freud for example, in his essay "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva*" writes about the relationship between art and psychoanalysis. In that essay, Freud discusses the dreams of Norbert Hanold, the protagonist of Jensen's novel. A key element of the story is the unconscious connection between Gradiva and Hanold's childhood friend, Zoe Bertgang. Freud uses the dynamics in this novel to confirm certain aspects of psychoanalytic theory. Of course he does this with other aesthetic and literary material: his book on Leonardo Da Vinci's life and his essay about *The Brothers Karazamov* "Dostoyevsky and Parricide" are but two examples.

Freud's stance, one which he articulated in his essay on Jensen's *Gradiva*, is that the artist preceded the psychoanalyst in understanding unconscious processes. Freud showed that artists have long been aware of human dynamics that have subsequently been articulated in psychoanalytic theory. The Oedipus

complex is one good example. So too are the comedy and irony of Shakespeare whose work revealed so much about the human condition long before a theory of psychoanalysis ever existed.

After Freud, many Freudian analysts sought to analyze art through the lens of psychoanalysis. Psycho-biographies were written and psychoanalytic interpretations of works of art were interpreted by analysts in the same way that they might interpret a dream, a parapraxis or some other unconscious manifestation. The logic of this approach is that it verifies existing psychoanalytic theory.

Lacan, in my view, took the stance that art enables the development of psychoanalytic theory. We can see this for example in his development of the idea of the *point de capiton*: the way in which the signified and signifier are knotted together. In Seminar III Lacan uses the example of Abner's fear of God, in Jean Racine's play *Athalie* to explain the way in which the *point de capiton* anchors (reorganizes in the case of Abner) one's network of signifiers. Another example can be found in Seminar XI, where Lacan's analysis of Holbein's painting *The Ambassadors* leads to a richer development of the concept of the object *a*. In both cases, art is not interpreted by psychoanalysis. Rather, art produces insight into unconscious processes thereby helping the analyst develop new ways of working.

Let me briefly return to the first perspective, that of psychoanalysis interpreting art. In my view, such a stance tends to reduce works of art to fantasy on one side or the symptom on the other. The approach symptomatizes art to an articulation both of the artwork itself and the artist who produced it. Thus it reduces the intangible that is at work when art is produced to fantasy and symptom. I want to argue however, that it is the unconscious which matters and in that sense the artist rather than the psychoanalyst is consistently the one who opens the path. Lacan makes this point well in his essay "Hommage to Marguerite Duras, on Le ravisement de Lol V. Stein". He suggests, and I am paraphrasing here, that the psychoanalyst, following Freud, must remember that the artist always precedes the psychoanalyst in insight related to the unconscious. Hence the analyst must refrain from acting as an analyst in relation to the artist and his/her work.

In what way does art function as an analyst? I submit that it functions as an analyst of the unconscious in today's social experience. This implies the historicist quality of the unconscious; that it changes over time. Such a view is consistent with the comparative historical method applied by Lacan. One can see this in his work on the relationship between the dramatic arts and psychoanalysis. In his work on Greek tragedy Lacan emphasized the difference between the tragedies of Greek antiquity with tragedy in the modern era. The change produced is a change concerning the unconscious as knowledge.

Why is the unconscious historically given? Because it has to do with language, as language has a life and a death. At least, if not dying (not all languages are dying), there are dead languages. But generally they are not dead. When they are alive they are changing all the time. They are changing both at the level of vocabulary and at the level of grammar. Therefore as the unconscious is an effect of language indeed the unconscious is marked by history.

Art, as I said, is an analyst of the unconscious, an unconscious organized by the life of language and historicist in the knowledge it produces. Therefore we can assume two things. First, that art reveals the truth about the era that produced it. Second, it shows something about the dominant relationship of *jouissance* as organizing the discourse of that historical moment. What do I mean? I am referring here to Lacan's theory of the four discourses as outlined in Seminar XVII. It is because art has a certain relation with the master's discourse that it can, let's say, enact the function of the analyst. As such, I propose the following hypothesis: *Art is a discourse in itself, just as psychoanalysis is another one.* For the purposes of clarification, let me elaborate a bit on the four discourses before trying to demonstrate why and how we can sustain that art is a discourse.

A discourse is defined by Lacan in two interconnected ways. First, within any discourse is the structure of a social link, i.e., any social link is considered to be a discourse. A social link produces speech which is structured in a particular way and organizes the subject at a certain historical moment. Second, the result of a discourse is a certain kind of formalization. In doing so, we formalize a certain kind of mode of *jouissance* or satisfaction. Thus, any social link is organized by a main mode of satisfaction. This primary discourse is what Lacan called the Master's discourse where what organizes the entire structure of the discourse is a master signifier. The core of my argument is that art provides insights into how a master discourse is organized.

Lacan's Seminar XVII, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis* not only develops four modes of discourse-- the master's discourse, the hysteric's discourse, the university discourse and the analytic discourse--but sustains the thesis that the discourse of the analyst is the reverse, the other side, of the master's discourse. That is, there is a relationship between the master's discourse which is the discourse of the unconscious at a certain given historical moment and the analyst's discourse as the interpretation of what sustains that master's discourse at that time.

My hypothesis would be therefore, that if we say that psychoanalysis interprets, (including art), and if we say that art interprets just as psychoanalysis does, therefore, art can function as a discourse. How is it organized? How does art as a discourse function? First, before proposing a model for the discourse of art let me refer to another point made by Lacan in his homage to Marguerite Duras. As is well known Duras' novels are powerful for the way in which the dialogue in them communicates what is not said. For Lacan her work was a cogent example

of discourse manifesting itself in relation to an object. For Lacan, this is what art does. It gives existence to objects. Like the role of the analyst in the discourse of the analyst, art stands in the places of the object *a*.

Let me now make an important distinction between the discourse of the analyst and what I am calling the discourse of art. In the discourse of analyst, the relationship between the object *a* and the divided subject is going to differ slightly when we conceptualize this relationship in terms of the discourse of art. In the former, the object *a* agent of discourse which in turn acts on the divided subject. That is, the relationship between the divided subject and the object of jouissance is absolutely veiled. It is veiled precisely by the functioning of the master signifier and of the knowledge related to that master signifier. In the latter, art as a discourse, the relationship of the object *a* is not to a divided subject but to knowledge directly. What reveals art in general is a relationship between an object of jouissance and knowledge. In the Master's discourse this relationship is absolutely veiled.

To elaborate, let me talk about two paintings, Holbein's *The Ambassadors* and Brueghel's *The Triumph of Death*. *The Ambassadors*, which Lacan writes about in Seminar XI, depicts two dignitaries of the era posing along side objects that represent wealth, power and knowledge. If seen from a certain angle, a human skull is also visible in the painting. For Lacan, this object is the agent of discourse. I will not elaborate here however, on all the interpretations of this famous painting.

Brueghel's *The Triumph of Death* which can be found in the Museo del Prado in Madrid similarly connotes the master's discourse at one level but simultaneously, as in *The Ambassadors*, the effects of the Real. In fact, the effects of the Real are much more central in this second example. We see a broad spectrum of people, from the poor to the rich engaged in a variety of activities organized by the triumph of death—the representation of which is among others is a human skeleton, riding the skeleton of a horse, pulling a cart full of human skulls. There is a decolage between those in the painting and that precise representation of death riding a skeleton horse. They are not at the same level, and one interprets the other.

Art provides an interpretation of the master's discourse by means of what the master's discourse veils. To reference *The Ambassadors* once again, if one is wealthy, powerful and representing the king, the Real is veiled. Yet, Holbein produces an object in order to make the Real present whereas it is generally hidden behind reality which is a mixture of the Imaginary and Symbolic.

Lacanian Compass

I am going to write the structure of discourse I was mentioning. First, the Master's Discourse:

$$\frac{S1}{\mathcal{S}} \rightarrow \frac{S2}{a}$$

Then I'll write the analyst's discourse:

$$\frac{a}{S2} \rightarrow \frac{\mathcal{S}}{S1}$$

Let us take another example, the work of the artist Francis Bacon and his famous work entitled: *Study After Velasquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X*. You know I think he made seven or eight versions of that painting, all of them different, but at different moments in his work. And in a way we can say that Bacon provides here an object which would be a cry, a shouting which provides different interpretation of the Pope Innocent than the one painted by Velasquez.

What art does it seems to me is successfully express unconscious knowledge and as such we can clearly understand why it precedes psychoanalysis. The artist and the analyst are, therefore, function in the same place in the discourse, in the place of the object. Certainly there are differences between the artist and the analyst. However, to begin with, let us establish some commonalities. First, they know that discourse is not organized by signifiers that it is not signifiers and especially not the master signifier that organize discourse as mode of satisfaction. That it is not the master signifier (S 1) that organizes the knowledge (S2). Secondly, and that is the difference between psychoanalysis and art. Art does not operate from subjective division when psychoanalysis does. What psychoanalysis does is to relate the object of satisfaction with the subject that lost that object. That is to say, to explain subjective division by the relation with the object that is lost since the beginning. I don't think art functions that way. The fundamental link in art between the object is not with a subject, it is not with a division, it is not with a wanting-to-be of the subject. It is my hypothesis, it has to do with knowledge as such, as organized, that is to say with the other of language in general.

If we consider what constitutes the master's discourse in general, what would suggest that an artist does not operate from either his/her fantasy or from his/her symptom? As I stated earlier in my comments about psychoanalysts who interpret art, it is not very interesting to reduce a work of art to a fantasy or a symptom. Although it might be true, but it doesn't produce any new knowledge

because art does not function that way, an artist does not create with his fantasy, with his symptom. Of course I am not saying that his fantasy counts for nothing, nor am I saying that if he has symptoms that they do not enter his work, but what I am saying is that the coherence or the condition to be produced has nothing to do with fantasy or symptom.

Of course we could develop a counter example although it would be a little tricky. But we can say that while everyone has fantasy, not everyone can create a work of art. If it was enough to have a symptom and produce art, okay, everyone would be an artist which is in my opinion not the case. So what is the mechanism necessary which impels that direct relationship between the object and knowledge? An artist provides knowledge to an object to unveil or unmask the object or a certain kind of knowledge. Where does that object come from if it doesn't come from fantasy or symptom?

I will go back to Freud who in writing about art and sublimation—albeit briefly—helps us make sense of this. Freud developed the concept of sublimation in order to designate a mode of satisfaction, drive satisfaction, which manifests itself without repression. The definition by Freud of sublimation is satisfaction without repression. Next, in this line of argument, we have to differentiate between sublimation and idealization. Typically, idealization is synonymous with sublimation. In so far as psychoanalysis is concerned there is no relationship between sublimation and idealization.

What is idealization? Idealization implies putting an object in the position of a signifier. That is to say, to transform an object into an ideal, i.e., into a master signifier. That is not what produces sublimation. Sublimation produces satisfaction in a more perverse way. If we wanted a model for sublimation it would be closer to perversion than to idealization; closer, in a way to psychosis. For that reason I believe there is no relation between fantasy and art creation.

Art therefore is a mode of satisfaction if it is organized by sublimation because it implies what Lacan calls, “recoupment.” This is the term we would use in English to designate the regaining of something that was lost. In this case, it is the recovery of the object. For the neurotic psychic structure, the mode of functioning of the object is determined by the loss. The object functions as a lost object. It therefore organizes desire after that, after what one might call the primary loss. That is the definition of repression. In art and in sublimation the object does not function as having been lost but functions as in having been recovered. Therefore, that object, recovered, is what produces the loss on the other side.

The objective or the intent of art is to find a way to recover an object and to get rid of the loss. The only way to get rid of the loss is to put it in the Other. Therefore, when in neurosis, for example, what the neurotic does is to put the object in the Other and takes the loss on one side. In art it is just the opposite.

You recover the object and put the loss in the Other of discourse, on the other side. That of course is a very important mode of satisfaction for a drive.

I am going to quote Lacan from his text on Duras. In this quote he is developing a notion of what might be called "language time." The key sentence is: "The thought by which I shall give her back her own knowledge." This is indeed what an analyst does; give someone back his/her own knowledge. The analyst in the place of the object *a* functions as the agent of discourse. To return to Lacan in his text on Duras he writes and I am paraphrasing here: "The thought by which I shall give her back her own knowledge would not bother her at the level of the unconscious to be the object *a*." That is absolutely what happens in analysis, it bothers the analysand at the level of the unconscious to be an object for an Other. To continue Lacan says: "Because this object she has already recovered it by her heart." So I find in that sentence let's say the point that allows me to interpret what art does so far as division and loss are concerned, in the discourse of art.

Now, what might we say are the consequences of taking this point of view? The first it seems to me is a clinical consequence. As far as art is concerned there is a neutralization of the structural difference between the structure of neurosis and psychosis. For me, it is of no interest to know an artist's psychic structure. It does not help understand the work of art you have in front of you. I make this point because it is often the case that people theorize about so-called genius being linked to psychosis in relation to certain artists. Similarly neurotics are often seen as capable of doing "decorative" art. This seems silly to me. I would argue that because art can function as a discourse it neutralizes structural difference. Emphasizing structural difference in my view is not a good way to understand art. This is because art is precisely a way to produce truth by canceling division on the artist's side and putting it on the other side just as putting the object in the place of the master signifier.

Let me develop two further points regarding the unconscious of our time as revealed by art of our time. Or, stated another way, what does art teach us about psychoanalysis? First, in our current social experience art and ideal are divorced from one another. That was not the case in previous periods of art where we can say that in many historical moments the object *a* was veiled or seemingly was veiled by the master signifier. Nowadays, the object *a* is totally separated from the master signifier. This has to do with the contemporary evolution of the master's discourse and the rise of the object *a* as Lacan and Miller after him both suggest. Such a view implies that the Real becomes increasingly important in the master's discourse. This is due to the strong influence science in the master's discourse. That object therefore, the object *a*, is less and less covered by the ego-ideal and the imaginary ideal ego. In art, both are disconnected from the object which presents itself more and more as Real without reference to a signifier or reference to shapes or to images. The object

presents itself more and more as rubbish, especially rubbish from the body. I think this is one of the lessons of contemporary art, to show the face or the structure of rubbish as an object of satisfaction. My argument here is in itself is an interpretation, absolutely the same interpretation as we discover in analytical discourse.

Let us say that art and psychoanalysis coincide on that same point, the status of rubbish of objects related to the body and organisms. The object is less and less placed in *a*. Rather it increasingly drops out of any general framing. In Holbein's *The Ambassador's* the object is still in the frame. In Francis Bacon's work, it is less present. In point of fact, Bacon is playing on framing. He is doing a frame within the frame of the painting, which of course as the result of this double framing there is no framing at all. Hence, one doesn't know where the proper framing is. If we take this perspective to its logical end, the object is going to be taken absolutely out of any possible framing, that is to say out of any organized whole.

The second point I want to discuss here is the increased teaching and use of "installation art." I must say it took me a very long time to appreciate and accept installations as art products which, for a long time I found unbearable. Of course installation art has to do with what I was saying about the status of objects as rubbish and as nonsense. The work of the French artist Christian Boltanski is an example of this. One of his installations, of which I do not remember the title, was in a place where there were some ordinary objects, common ordinary objects which happen to have been collected in a studio. The objects belonged to a young girl who had disappeared ten years earlier. All of them placed there, a glass, a pair of tights, a pair of shoes, bits and pieces which were left in her room the day she disappeared. Pure contingency but at the same time necessity they were everyday objects, necessary objects. However, when they were put like that, within a closed place and without any particular order, of course they had no more order in the bedroom of the girl I suppose. It was the same meaning. It was the same interpretation in a way, death, death and lack of meaning of all those objects of life left lost. We know who was lost; the girl was lost. The objects were lost too. Of course the effect on people who were watching was precisely the effect I was mentioning, it was division. Subjective division was on the side of those experiencing the installation who experienced it as a kind of malaise or sadness.

In Bilbao, Spain. I saw a wonderful exhibition on Russian art. There were a few installations, one of them being one box with a little puppet turning on itself right in the middle of those works of very modern Russian art. The title of the installation, I am paraphrasing here, was something like: "Turning over in the grave," which means to be very upset or to be shocked by something. I saw the title of this installation as a witz in a way.

What my discussion here shows is the increasingly prevalent role of the object detached from signifiers and the serial way in which objects are presented in installation art. That is, to one object and another one and another one, and so on, without any signifying order. This implies that we are no longer in a world of metaphor. We are at best in a world of metonymy, of frontier, of one at the side or the other one at the side of the other one. In France this is the way we understand the phenomenon of neighborhoods. This is very important for us in psychoanalysis to know because I think it is exactly the representation of what has become of the unconscious today.

Lacan, in his last seminars, interrogates himself and his audience, asking the following question "Is the unconscious Real or Imaginary?" Of course, this perplexed every trained Lacanian analyst and student. We all thought the unconscious was symbolic because we thought it had to do with signifiers, therefore, it is grounded in the Symbolic. However, the so-called later Lacan's answer to this question is not the Symbolic order but the Real. The status of Real of the unconscious parallels the transition from modern art to installation art. In the previous historical moment the unconscious was the treasure trove of signifiers within the symbolic order. We are now in an unconscious which is no longer organized in that way. If we take as axiomatic for example what Jacques-Alain Miller says about the fact that we have shifted from a discourse organized by the "of all" to a world which is organized by the "not-all." That is to say current discourse operates by a mechanism that does not answer to the principle of universality, nor, therefore to the principle of metaphor. It seems to me this is a way that art and psychoanalysis are discovering at the same time the main structure of that knowledge, that is to say, of the unconscious.

MHB, responding to a question about sublimation of the drives as it relates to artists and their creative processes: Yes, you are right. I was wondering about that myself. Both Freud and Lacan point out that not all drives can be sublimated. Therefore, part of the drive sticks to, or remains, with the symptom. Not everything in the drive can be sublimated, only a part of it can be. What is not sublimated becomes a symptom for an artist as it is for anybody else. However, in a way I am not sure that those symptoms are necessary although a lot of artists think they are. I had an artist, a very famous one, in analysis. He agreed to come to analysis because he was very frightened by death. This fear of death was exacerbated by the death of one of his best friends who died of a cocaine overdose. Of course my patient was doing a lot of cocaine as well. At the beginning of the analysis he thought his creativity was linked to his use of cocaine. However, at a moment in the treatment something related to his analytical work transformed him in such a way that he quit using cocaine without any problem. Also, it was as I thought. Cocaine had little to do with his artistic creativity because he continued creating even better than before. However, for such a long time, he thought it was the cocaine that had allowed him to be creative. I think that many artists think that if they are taking cocaine or if they

have this or that symptom or if they eat or if they don't eat they are going to be more creative. It is not true.

To better address your question, I think we can answer with Freud that not all of the drive can be transformed into sublimation, and this is very clear for any artist, independent of psychic structure. As far as symptoms are concerned I should say that artists are subjects like the rest of us and therefore they are not particularly interesting. I mean they are not different from others. What is very different is to produce or not to produce that kind of object.

In my talk today, I have sought to explain Freud's and even more so Lacan's thesis that art precedes the analyst as far as knowledge is concerned; unconscious knowledge. Further, I sought to develop the notion that in the Lacanian tradition that we do not apply psychoanalysis to art but let ourselves be taught by art. It is something that was frequently said by Lacan. I am going to give a discursive demonstration of why he said such a thing. To psychoanalyze an author can be fun. As I stated earlier, it is common to do so in academia. Such analyses often depend on biographical elements of the author, often referring to family upbringing or particular life events. As we know, it is easier to explain the past than it is to predict the future. So I think it can be fun but not very interesting.

Having said that I think there are ways to talk about insights that artists can provide to psychoanalysis. Lacan's discussions of Gide and of Joyce are two examples. In Lacan's essay "Jeunesse d'André Gide" he addresses the question of the pervert psychic structure. The complexity of Gide's case also helps Lacan clarify the name of the father function. In doing so, Lacan used Gide's personal papers extensively as well as Jean Delay's psychobiography of Gide. However, Lacan was not interested in objectifying Gide, but rather using his case as a way to advance certain ideas in psychoanalysis. This is also the case in Lacan's discussion of James Joyce in Seminar XXIII. He does not discuss Joyce in order to demonstrate that Joyce was psychotic, although he happens to make that hypothesis. What interested him in Joyce was to learn from him the way a symptom can be defined in a different way from the classical definition of the symptom in psychiatry and in psychoanalysis. That is to say, he uses Joyce to invent a new definition and a new function of what the symptom is in psychoanalysis. This is a prime example of the psychoanalyst being taught by the artist. Joyce taught Lacan the meaning of a symptom at that moment in the history of language.

Today, as in Lacan's period of discovery, art can show us the way. These days art is less and less related to metaphor, that is to say the production of meaning. The same is true in psychoanalysis. Instead of the end of an analysis revealing a kind of paternal or master meaning, it increasingly reveals its being without meaning; pure contingency.

Beacon

Psychic Suffering and the Treatment Challenges of the Postmodern World

Marie-Hélène Brousse

Miami, FL USA

January 13, 2007

Transcribed by Matthew Schneider

Text established by Gary S. Marshall

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My remarks today represent a continuation of the dialogue we are having about the theme of these Second Annual Clinical Study Days: *Psychic Suffering and the Treatment Challenges of the Postmodern World*. I will address a series of issues some of which are well known; others perhaps less well known. As is the tradition within the World Association of Psychoanalysis (WAP), I will frame my ideas in the context of the clinic.

Let me begin by making a point about the term postmodern. I am well aware that there is a fully developed theory of postmodernism that is commonly discussed, especially here in the United States. My aim here is not to address questions of postmodern theory. Rather, I want to give meaning to the term.

What does it mean to talk about the postmodern world? I would argue that we no longer see modernity as one continuous march toward progress. Nor do we consider scientific innovation exclusively as an artifact of progress. We consider and are increasingly fascinated with the effects of the discourse of science on the way we live. Science has become more of a dialectical process. It no longer solely signifies a continuous march toward a better world. It is true however, that the master discourse these days is a discourse responding to and organized by scientific rationality. It is manifest not only in its discursive forms but in its ideological and political forms as well. This includes the discourse of economics the form of which also models the logic of science.

How has the discourse of science affected the subject; the people living within its framework? What has changed? What has not changed? One major change has been the waning of the symbolic order. As both Jacques-Alain Miller and Eric Laurent have emphasized, signifiers have less power these days. This does

not preclude however, attempts to restore the traditional master signifier—God. However, even in such instances the scientific discourse becomes interwoven. I'm not sure if you are aware but the area of Miami where we are holding this conference has a significant population of Orthodox Jews. A colleague who lives in the area explained that the elevators in his apartment building are specially programmed on the Jewish Sabbath to stop on every floor. This technological intervention thus allows Jewish residents—who in following the Sabbath rule are not allowed among other things to turn on electricity by themselves during the Sabbath—to use the elevator. So you see, religious discourse does not prevent the discourse of science from organizing our actions and behaviors with our body, our friends, with our general way of being and foremost, with our objects. That is indeed what science changes; our objects.

With the waning power of the signifier and therefore of the symbolic order, the Real surfaces more readily. This situation is evident in the clinical setting as well. This is what I will try to demonstrate. Let me begin by pointing out that the discourse of science reduces truth to a logical and operational dimension. Lacan characterizes this as the power of the letters—the lower case letters of scientific formulae. As a result, truth is no longer linked to the broader symbolic system. It is no longer linked with the Big Other and the master signifiers prevalent in other eras where traditional authority held sway.

One consequence of this shift is the increasingly marked disjunction between truth and authority. We now find ourselves in a world where the limit, that is to say, the limit of jouissance, is no longer based on prohibition; the fundamental “no.” Science replaces prohibition with possibility. The structural logic of social life thus shifts from an axis in which something is either prohibited or allowed to an axis where something is either possible or impossible.

Of course I am just developing the broad outline of an argument about the changes in the function of authority in society. I want to call your attention to the crucial essay written by Miller and Laurent entitled: “The Other who does not exist and his ethical committees.” On this point, the establishment of an ethical committee or better stated a moral committee, symbolizes the exact moment when a social order based on an axis of what is either possible or impossible supplants a social order grounded in traditional authority and prohibition.

Certainly one can find circumstances where there are attempts to reassert the logic of prohibition. Nevertheless, what does it mean to argue that the social order is no longer organized around the name-of-the-father; the paternal function? Lacan's discussion of sexuation in Seminar XX can provide some insight. In Lacan's famous diagram on sexuation, the two formulas of the masculine side, organize the world of speaking beings in relation to the exception, i.e., the father as well as the universal, i.e., the castration function. It is important to note that the castration function for Lacan means that each subject is inscribed in language. The “castration” is the lack experienced as a

result of coming under the law of the signifier. In other words, one has to pass through the signifier to express demand and to satisfy desire and jouissance. We might say that this is the traditional way of formulating the discourse of the master. We are no longer under that unique mode of organization.

We are now, and Miller makes this point very clearly in an article published in *Mental*, in a world where the other side is the prevalent mode of organization. Lacan referred to his discussion on this point as his fantasy logic because the formulae he uses to delineate the so-called other side of psychoanalysis do not obey the rules of formal logic as such. The two formula of the feminine side which is now-a-days commonly dominant, let's say or at least in an everyday neighborhood with the two others. In the first, $\exists x \Phi x$, there is no x not subject to the phallic function. This first line means that there is no first principle of prohibition; there is no one unique name-of-the-father. There can be many; there can be none. Based on this point Miller emphasizes that we live in an era where the *multiple* is the central signifier around which things are organized.

Let me recount a tangible example. In France, if you are a homosexual man you cannot by law get married to a same sex partner. So, okay, you and your partner fly to Spain where gay marriage is legal. Neither is it possible in France for a gay man and his same sex partner to have a child. Again, okay, one can go to the U.S. and through a legal contract with a surrogate mother, produce a child. In the society of the multiple there is always a solution. The internet, too, is a reflection of the world of the multiple regardless of some countries' attempts to limit access to it.

With the second formula $\forall x \Phi x$, the negation is on the universal. Hence, we are in an era of the multiple and an era in which there are also no universals. This suggests, as Lacan asserts, a specific kind of diminishing of the name-of-the-father. What becomes manifest instead is the multiplication of micro-symbolic orders along side the multiplication of limits.

Therefore when I say we passed from the world of prohibition world to a world based on the principle of the possible/impossible I am not saying that there are no limits. I am saying that the limits will multiply. Borders are going to multiply and interconnect in order to produce a very complicated world of provinces, communities and of other kinds of social arrangements.

The world of the multiple yields less phallic value. If we again refer back to Lacan's diagram on sexuation, a social order based on prohibition is represented by the formulae on the masculine side of the diagram, wherein the phallic function is verified (There is an x). In a social order based on the possible, the phallic function is not verified and as a result there is an absence of subjective division. In Seminar XX, Lacan confirms this point as he begins talking not about the subject per se, but about the *parlêtre* – *the speaking being*.

This corresponds with an erasure of subjective division. While the role of language remains paramount, the speaking being is differentiated from the traditional divided subject who, rooted in the symbolic order, is a signifier for another signifier. The speaking being in Lacan's view is closer to a type of object. The latter is increasingly evident in clinical settings. More and more people come for treatment without any awareness that their symptom is in itself a form of knowledge or stated another way constitutes an answer. Instead they want to get rid of it.

Concomitantly, castration has shifted from a symbolic process to an event in the Real. In a moment I will explore what this means. Also, I would argue that in our practice of mental health today we are no longer dealing with one master signifier but with what Lacan calls a swarm. In one we find others. Such a view fits with the multiplication of limits and the decentralization of the name-of-the-father.

So what is the implication then of what I have been discussing? What is the effect of these changes of the postmodern world on psychic suffering and therefore on treatment? Let us use a classical Lacanian argument found in Seminar XXII, *R.S.I.* In delineating the multiple names of the father, Lacan provides three new names: anxiety, symptom, and inhibition. How should we understand this? My way of understanding this is to think precisely in terms of limits. The naming of the father was in itself a limit. Therefore the function, the name-of-the-father, is a limit. What are the other ways to create limit when one does not have traditional authority in the form of a signifier?

Well, symptom, anxiety and inhibition provide limits to the speaking being. When you are inhibited, when you can't speak in public, for example, it constitutes a limit. It protects you from something. When you feel anxiety, a phobia for example, this too is a limit. You can't go in a place where there are certain kinds of objects. You can't watch such-and-such a movie. Symptom, anxiety and inhibition are new names-of-the-father because they provide limits without the authority of a master. They provide limits in a way that is analogous to what I was saying about science; in a *Real* way. They provide limits on the axis of what is either possible or impossible. In direct terms they provide an "*I can't*". In other words, I have this symptom, and therefore, "I can't". I have this anxiety I can't go out in the street, I can't come and see you or I can't speak in public. So these kinds of names-of-the-father provide limits in the way science accepts limits, that is to say, by confrontation with the Real.

Education today is very much, at least in France, organized in that direction. It is designed for example, to provide a child with situation where he/she does not have to face the prohibition of an adult who says "No, you don't have the right to do that." Rather, the situation is organized in such a way that it is impossible for the child to do it. Thus he or she learns of the limit through experience as opposed to some formal interdiction. Hence, the idea in education is to confront child with the Real. It's not that I forbid him; it's just that he's going to discover

that it's impossible. So you erase authority as such and you put in the place of the guarantee of authority, the Real. These new names-of-the-father obey the same logic; the logic of impossibility. We are living in a world where the main question is, is it possible or is it impossible? It is no longer a question of is it authorized or unauthorized?

Of course it is not always readily apparent especially in the United States which is such a litigious society. Nevertheless, the law comes generally after the Real, in order to replace the Real. For example, I was amazed by a story in the U.S. of a woman who put a kitten in her microwave oven and the poor animal exploded. Apparently, she sued the microwave company and won the lawsuit because it was not written anywhere in the instructions that live animals should not be microwaved. How can we analyze this example in the light of what I am saying? Well, microwave ovens are quick. I suppose she had washed her kitten and wanted him to dry him quickly. Thus, the only limit to what is possible appears to be the law in the form of cautionary claims. In other words, a rule as a warning about a limit in the Real, rather than as law as something absolutely arbitrary the power of which stems from a master signifier. It is a warning and it is for you.

French society is late in moving toward this orientation. In France, everywhere you go there are signs that begin with: "It is forbidden to:" Then what follows will be a list of prohibitions, e.g., it is forbidden to litter, etcetera. At the bottom of the sign, in smaller letters, will be the number and the date of the law. How does this distant French authority compare with say Great Britain? About ten years ago, I was walking in Hyde Park and saw the British version of the sign I just described. How was it formulated? The potential offenses were listed but there was no prohibition per se. Rather there was a list of fines. So, in fact it was possible to litter, etc., but it would cost you a certain price. In France one does not even consider doing this. It is just forbidden. The Anglo-Saxon way of governing replaces the law with the market. It is possible if you want to pay the price. It is up to you.

The Anglo-Saxon world has been oriented toward the scientific management of limits for a longer period of time than in France. We in France have followed a different form of managing limits, the Napoleonic master. Napoleon, who absolutely fascinates the British precisely because he is the master: "Do that. Why? Because I say so and shut up!" It is more totalitarian in a way, more French.

On this point there has been a great deal made these days of America as empire. If it is the case, then I think the American empire will be finished quickly. I am not saying the power of the United States is going to perish. Not at all, it is getting bigger and bigger, but the idea of an empire: that is a model that cannot hold. It has to do in my view with the shift away from a strong symbolic order toward the surfacing of the Real in social life. Maybe I'm wrong. An empire can make the Real appear as well.

What about these new names-of-the-father? Earlier, Maria-Christina Aguirre developed the theme of anxiety and talked about a continuum from anxiety to depression. What is anxiety? This may sound scandalous, but in a way anxiety is fear not linked to a signifier. It is a fear without a signifier. Anxiety, as Lacan says, is not without an object. So let us hypothesize that anxiety is a fear organized by an object and not by a signifier. It is linked therefore to the appearance of jouissance under the form of an object. Anxiety is a limit, as far as jouissance is concerned by the materialization of jouissance in the object *a*. On this point, what is becoming commonplace in our clinic, in the public imagination and in the DSM is the panic attack. A panic attack is anxiety in its most powerful presentational form.

Thus, the work to be done is to always find the object, which is not an object of fear, but the object included in that panic attack. There will be the subject's answer to the anxiety. In a way, our treatment of anxiety is to make anxiety a symptom. To reduce anxiety to a symptom is to build a link. This is paradoxical because anxiety becomes manifest in order to erase the link between the subjective reaction and the object that provokes that reaction.

Now, let us take up the question inhibition. I think in that context we can frame some of the new forms of body-imaginary limits. Let me use an example from my practice. I have an acquaintance. He is not an analyst and works in an entirely different profession. He eats too much and is very obese. He has tried a lot of solutions including psychoanalytic treatment. Nothing worked and in the end he decided to have his stomach stapled. This is an increasingly common procedure where bands and staples are used to reduce the size of a person's stomach, thereby reducing the amount of food a person can ingest. The man is happy, satisfied. He lost I don't know how many kilos. What kind of kind of solution is that? It is a solution at the level of the Real. In terms of limits, it is a body with a device. A device body we could say? There are a lot of bodily strategies so to speak, the use of drugs being one also. In other words, something that works for the subject at the level of the body. Addiction is that way.

In a way, for that man, I am not saying it is the case for every person who is obese. However, for that man it was an addiction, and he clearly said it. He was addicted to drinking and eating all the time and he could not live without that. So it was a food and drink addiction and the solution was a body solution, but addiction itself is a body solution in a way. So I propose to frame this through the lens of inhibition. Perhaps it seems a bit bizarre because this case seems to be the opposite of inhibition. Framed another way, they both operate on the same plane, inhibition on one side and addiction on the other.

So you've got drugs, prescribed medicines, you've got surgery and a few other solutions provided on that same level. Let us talk about anorexia. I would put it in the same group. It is more clearly on the side of inhibition. In that field of

inhibition we know that the body both as image and as organism is going to be the main place for the limit.

Participant: But we know that there could be death, e.g., the death of the anorexic or the death of an addict.

MHB: Oh, yes, of course. But I don't think that they want to find death. I don't think it is suicide, not at all. They happen to find it as a limit but they don't look for it. That is why when you say to someone who has a drug addiction or is anorexic: "You are going to die," it does not register with them. When you interpret for them on the side of death it is absolutely useless. They are not at all afraid of that, not at all.

This topic makes me think of a patient presentation I did in Italy, in Turin. It was the kind of institution that exists in Italy, out in the country, receiving patients from everyday life. The patient was a young girl with a terrible story. Five overdoses had more or less led her to the frontier of death. She led a very edgy life, had taken many risks, had been in some very difficult and abusive relationships, had her children taken from her due to neglect, etc.

In the course of the presentation as she was telling me her history, I said, "But I would be dead with fear if I were you. You don't know fear, do you?" "Oh yes" she said, "I can't stand birds". So, she produced a little bird phobia in that panorama of the chaos of her life. She had been a prostitute, she had been beaten, she had been hospitalized and yet the only thing she was afraid of was pigeons. All the assistants were amazed by her answer, and well, here she had a limit. I started speaking about birds with her and also with the therapeutic team in order to take, advantage of this small limit that emerged within her world of totally unlimited jouissance. I don't know how it turned out. She was receiving psychoanalytic treatment in that institution. I thought it was very important, in that terrible world, still a limit could be found, by that young woman, not by me. It was the last thing I was expecting her to tell me.

There are many examples of the use of our body in the everyday world. When I went to London last week they told me about a case, I think it was happening in the United States. It was a case of a father and a mother of a nine year old mentally handicapped child. This was the case of the so-called "Pillow Baby". Doctors were providing a medical, surgical treatment to the child. They removed her uterus and some other parts of her body in order to keep her more like a child, more easy to manage, more easy to care for. So now we live in a world where you can cut bits and pieces of the body. In a way that implies that the body is no longer functioning as a limit but in a way it provides a multiplication of limits by operating on the body. The body itself is no longer a limit as such but there is a multiplication of limits using the body.

Now, a third point about the clinic of today. As I said, the subject has become less and less important with regard to its subjective division and the object gains more and more importance. The rise of the object as both Lacan and Miller have noted, has to do with precisely, the rise of scientific discourse and the multiplication of objects in our market based social world. No doubt, it has consequences for psychic suffering and therefore, treatment. Given this situation, I want to propose an argument. If objects are more and more central these days, more and more used against castration, against let's say the logics of language, therefore perversion has become a new solution. Of course these days there are a lot of claims about perversion in society. However, I can't say that I am seeing more patients with perverted behavior nor with a pervert structure.

Rather, I think the meaning of perversion has changed. What we see is not an increase in the pervert structure but the pervert style as a mode of jouissance. It is what Lacan was calling at the end of his teaching, père-version. That is to say that those perversions, actions through the object now take the place where the father function was previously. In that regard, it is not perversion but a certain kind of fetishism. Fetishism for example in the way we might understand a parent's relationship to a child, e.g., the use of the object child as a condition for satisfaction. This implies, and this is my last point on new symptoms, a new form of family.

Let me share the following example which was brought to my attention during supervision. What was in question in this case was the patient's structure. The patient in question was a stage actor who changed careers because he wanted to make more money. Even though he was relatively successful as an actor, he was not well off. So, he changed careers and became quite wealthy in his second career. One of his goals as it turned out was to have a biological child. He was gay but did not have a life partner. He came to the United States and arranged a contractual relationship with two different women. The first woman was the egg donor and the second was the surrogate mother who carried the egg to term. During the pregnancy, the man visited from France several times. When the child was born, he returned to France with the baby.

In short order, he discovered that raising the child would be a full-time job and so he asked his own mother to move in and take care of the baby with him. A zest of incest let's say! For him, this situation was perfectly normal. Scientifically correct but subjectively a little less so. In fact he only began to consider that the implications of his situation, when he felt a strong, terrible desire to have another child. So he went to see an analyst, saying: "I already have a child, he is very nice and I want a second one". In the conversation, it came out that he wanted a second child because he wanted a girl. In fact, he was concerned because he had not been able to structure a contract for the second child that would guarantee the sex of the child. His analyst asked him why he wanted a girl. He wanted a girl in order to pass down his mother's engagement ring who herself

had received it from the mother of her husband and etcetera, etcetera for centuries. Although this man had a brother who was married, that brother had sons and therefore the maternal lineage would not be maintained. So, he wanted his daughter; his future daughter to have the ring.

The question as I said earlier was regarding this man's psychic structure. What was it? No psychotic phenomenon was evident. The man was very well adapted to life. He was a good father to his son. He didn't want to become woman himself. He wanted a *transmission* as was discussed yesterday in this conference. Was it a case of perversion? Fetishism, perhaps? This seems very plausible because of the conditions around having this second child. The child was an extension of the engagement ring. I argue that this is a kind of fetishism because the child is totally separated from sexual desire and sexual difference. So it's not linked, by any means, to the concept of difference.

I would argue that one sees more and more of these kinds of relationship to children. These are new forms of family, let's say.

These new forms of families, which I'm not condemning in any way, are characterized in my view by a new dynamic of difference. The difference is not between function, i.e., mother and father, nor at the level of gender. So, where is the difference? It is at the level of the system, a new family system. This is where the difference is manifest because otherwise it wouldn't function as a system. All systems require a differential element that allows a system to function. Certainly it is an element of difference which is absolutely different from the others, from the previous ones.

In my view, we are likely going to face a rise of behaviors and lifestyles organized by the replacement of a master signifier with an object. We can qualify this as a fetishist solution in life, wherein the solution of the transformation from jouissance to desire is passed through an object.

What are the treatment possibilities? There is the behaviorist approach. What is proposed to a subject when one is proposing behavioral therapy? I think the axiom of behavior therapy is "You will get used to it." Further, "Once you are used to it, you will like it!" So what is the use? Let's make a joke evoking Wittgenstein: *Meaning is use, use is meaning*. Behavioral therapy provides the solution of "meaning as use".

We psychoanalysts do not do this. Nor do we provide a medical solution, i.e., a body solution. What is our method? I think our method is the "symptom" solution. What is the symptom? The symptom is a kind of truth. So in a very strange way we provide the "truth" solution. Our definition of truth has to do with material matter of language. That is to say *lalangue*. Psychoanalytic treatment is a material approach but it is not concerned with body transformation as in the earlier case of the man who had his stomach stapled as the solution to the

symptom of obesity. It is material because we are dealing with a knowledge which is real. It's our version of limits. Lalangue, the language with double L is in itself our limit. What stands in place of the position of prohibition in this version of a limit? Prohibition was never the psychoanalytic solution. The analytical discourse is not the master's discourse.

What are we proposing? I think we are proposing desire and love. This solution implies our saying to the subject: desire has a price. The price the subject is paying for his desire is reintroduced at the level of subjective division. Also as far as the objective division is concerned our solution would be real love. I think this is a more interesting solution than both body interventions and use. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the cognitive-behavioral modality is the most widely accepted approach in our society today. Again, use is certainly a value that many prize highly.

Marie-Christina Aguirre: I think is fascinating because your talk today gives another perspective to everything that we were saying yesterday. I have two points. One of them was this question of the multiplication of the name-of-the-father. Is it not from this perspective that we can understand what I mentioned yesterday as the multiplication or the rise of new religions? Before, we were in the world of one religion, i.e., one father, one God. That was the realm of the one name-of-the-father. Nowadays, in this realm of the multiplication of the name of the father, we also see the multiplication of the religions. My second point and perhaps it is more of a comment is with regard to what you were saying about the difference between the law of the Napoleonic order and the law in the Anglo-Saxons. The French also say that not only is one not supposed to ignore the law, everyone one is supposed to know it.

In the Anglo-Saxon world we have the common law, the laws are not written, the laws are made as the infractions come. So there's nothing already written there that we can refer to.

Thomas Svolos: A small question. Several of the speakers and those who asked questions yesterday used the word transmission in reference to what Lacan says in the essay entitled "Two Notes on the Child". In other words, a point about what gets transmitted between the generations. This was also invoked by Manya and there was some discussion about that. So my question is: In the families of today and in what we call postmodernity has anything changed in what gets transmitted between the generations? In other words, Manya talked about a shift from a transmission to a conversion within the church. Has there been a shift within the family to something different in our time now?

MHB: Yes, let me first address this question of transmission. I think it is very interesting question. What does Lacan say about family and transmission in the family? We know it had been a preoccupation for him since his essay of 1938 on the family. To be brief, in a family, generally at the social level what is being

transmitted is name and wealth, or poverty which is the same dynamic. It just depends on your family. So, wealth and a name. That is not what is central for psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is not the mere transcription of anthropology or sociology. What is important for psychoanalysts in transmission? I'm going to paraphrase Lacan who said that it is the transmission of a desire that is not anonymous. That is what is important for a subject in a family as far as Lacan is concerned. What does this mean?

For me it certainly doesn't mean the desire to have a child. It is not simply the common sense discourse: I desire a child therefore everything is okay for my child because he was desired—No! A desire which is not anonymous is not only the desire of that object *a*, i.e., a child. If the child is an object *a*, it is cause of desire, it is not object desired, only. Beyond the child as object desired there is another desire which is not anonymous and is caused by an object.

On this point Lacan notes that a woman is typically the object *a* for a man. If they have a child together the child and the woman are both put into the position of object *a*. Let me give you an example. A gay man and his partner decide to have a child. A lesbian friend agrees to carry the child. She is forty years old also wanted a child. The child is conceived through artificial insemination. The baby will be born in a few months. This is an example of the new form of the family. They are already working out a parenting plan to define who will have the baby on different days of the week. It is true that they desire a child. That child is going to be much desired, but it's a desire that does not imply sexual difference first. It's a desire absolutely (it's not a criticism, it's a description I'm making) without sexual interference they even didn't act to have that child.

So it is a desire that is absolutely separated from sexual difference. In the case example we are talking about there are two characteristics. The first is having a child through which one can transmit wealth and a name. The second characteristic is that what we have here is desire without sex. There is no sexuality. Is it a desire that is not anonymous. Another dynamic is that the gay man in this particular example had been adopted as a child. He was adamant about having a biological child. The desire which is not anonymous in this case is narcissistic.

Of course this does not imply that in a very, let's say biological way, between a man and a woman, a desire would not be narcissistic either. A lot of people have children in a narcissistic way of desiring. That is not an absolutely anonymous disposition. I think it is not anonymous because he wants to be the father of that child. What I am frightened about, although I don't think it's going to be like that. It could be the desire of a masculine community; they wanted a boy lets say. I would be more worried about the baby if he wanted only a boy. If he wants to construct a relationship not of homosexuality in the sexual term, but of *homo* as unique. So that is what I would say about transmission. For an analyst what is important to be transmitted is a desire and a desire with a name.

Lacanian Compass

Now new religions coming on, it's true. But I have to be careful in that matter because I am French and we have a strong tradition of anticlericalism, so I have to be cautious in that matter with my counter transference. Nevertheless, I think that the world of religion in the future correlates to a strong identification with the Lacanian imaginary. It will be a bit like the world of the *Star Wars* movies. It is a world where some have a trunk, some have four hands, some have two heads, etc. Well I think that is what religion is like now. Some are going to have hats, some are going to have crosses, some are going to have turbans, and some are going to have veils. What will be important is the identification with the image. Of course it's not only that, it's a belief in certainty and so forth. I know all that. But what has become increasingly important is showing these the external signs of religion.

In the past in France, the custom was not to make one's religious affiliation overt. The idea was that one could practice the religion of one's choice as long as it was a private matter, not a public matter. These days, everywhere including in France the reverse is true. People want to be recognized by through external marks and signs. That is what made me think of the star wars world in a way. We won't have trunks but we will have a veil. What we see then is imaginary identification replacing symbolic recognition. As a result there will be many Romeo & Juliet love stories, tragic love stories which will produce more and more desire. If I have a certain kind of hat, who knows, I might perhaps be attracted to someone with a veil. There we can find a new way to a link between desire and prohibition.

Beacon

TESTIMONY OF THE PASS IN NEW YORK

Mauricio Tarrab

One day as I was taking my daily walk near my house in Buenos Aires, I found glued to a wall a small advertising that offered literature courses, with an inscription of a beautiful verse by J.L.Borges. It read:

“The story goes that in that time past

Where so many things happened

Real, imaginary and uncertain

I bring this to mind here to locate the perspective one should have when one has concluded an analysis and is looking back, especially if one has to give a testimony that may be conveyed to one's colleagues. One rebuilds a story with “all those real, imaginary and uncertain things” with which one has built the mortar of life. But we should also say that doing analysis and finishing it implies not only reconstructing the past and making the experience of the unconscious; it also implies the contingency, the novelty, the surprise and the unforeseen event.

I have to say that in my case, the act of speaking here in New York, in front of you, is an unforeseen event in my life. I can assure you that nothing could have led me to foresee it. The fact itself that I have to speak through this translation shows how unprepared I was for this occasion, and how I will try to show you towards the end of my speech something of my relationship as a subject of the language.

To undergo analysis is in a certain way to find the footprints that have marked us, and along this path we hope to reduce the weight of the *pathos* that affects our body and mind. This pathos is what we call our symptoms.

The person who takes and follows this path does it because she suffers intensely in the search for knowledge or truth. Or because too much knowledge has confronted her with an unbearable truth, or because hiding the truth gives knowledge a role as buffer that is the cause of the suffering.

The beginning of the road of analysis and the progress along it is marked either by the certainty of anxiety, or by the invasion of a mortifying *jouissance*; or by the excess work required by the need to support the neurotic symptom, or by the unbearable modulation of the pain of being; or even by the weight of the moral law.

These footprints I am referring to are the footprints of the unconscious, the footprints followed by Freud and those he taught us to follow after him. When we try to have a subject follow the path of analysis, what we try to do is to make him see in principle the footprints that his senses place in front of his eyes. These are the traces of the sexual sense that we follow with Freud, as the surest clues to mitigate the suffering of the symptom.

These are the footprints of the unconscious, which in the end lead us to the footprint of trauma and its consequences. These are the footprints that lead us to the edge of the unknown, to the navel of the Freudian dream, where all the answers that can give us sense and meaning end.

Many of these footprints are erased in one's life, but there are also footprints that never fade away.

There are indelible images, unforgettable words, long-lasting events, inerasable memories, eternal feelings. In them, fiction and reality are subtly intertwined. There are also the footprints of the symptom where that same limit, that same intertwining, that same edge, are played.

In this *littoral*, as J. Lacan liked to say, we find in the life of each one of us the imaginary, the symbolic and the real. These are the points where language and satisfaction; where words and bodies are uniquely intertwined for each of us. This leaves footprints.

In the Lacanian-oriented psychoanalysis we follow these footprints, because we think that what each one of us does in our life, the thing that somehow directs that for which we suffer, love and experience *jouissance*, that which is the basis of what we are, has its foundations there.

For this reason, psychoanalysis is so antinomic with our times. And that justifies talking of the path of analysis and of the end of analysis. I will illustrate this antinomy with an example of the most common occurrences of everyday life: reading a newspaper as a weekend starts in Buenos Aires.

Every Saturday morning we receive in our home, together with the usual daily newspaper, a condensed edition of the New York Times. In last month's issue (August 18, 2007) we found an example of the direction followed by the world in an area that interests us, that is, the survival of the subject and his dignity.

It is an article signed by a Benedict Carey, which describes with enthusiasm a recent experiment made by psychologists at Yale University, who altered the mind of people participating in the experiment by giving them a simple cup of coffee. The subjects of this study had no idea how their social instincts were being deliberately manipulated. On their way to the laboratory they had crossed an assistant who was carrying several objects in his hands, as well as a cup of

hot or frozen coffee, which he asked them to help him with. That was enough: the students who held the cup of frozen coffee rated a hypothetical person about whom they read later on during the experiment as colder, less social and more selfish than the students who had held the cup of hot coffee just for a moment. And he goes on...New studies reveal that people clean more thoroughly when they can perceive in the air a subtle aroma of cleansing liquid ... and the scientific findings continue...

This is not the time to discuss the ill-fated and broadly disseminated influence of behavioral scientificisms in modern explanations of the thing that guides the lives of people.

I just have to use this to put tension into the Freudian aspiration that we continue to uphold: to enforce the particularity of each subject against the crushing tendency of subjective differences derived from experimentations such as those with coffee cups or cleaning liquids. Naive but promising for marketing experts.

Psychoanalysis, in this sense, is not hypermodern. Against the banalization and the anonymity of the modern day subject, it defends this singular dimension of each person, which makes each one incomparable, that is, this singularity that cannot be taken by any experimental situation.

If undergoing analysis meant only following the footprints already laid, then it would be just a new way of repetition. This has been the lost way of psychoanalysis: the way of an analyst sleuth à la Sherlock Holmes and a patient that finally finds the moment of the trauma, which reproduces the current scene and liberates the patient...Hollywood has not overcome the conception of a pre-Freudian cathartic psychoanalysis. This is not what it's all about, because analysis itself leaves footprints, it leaves new and fresh footprints.

This means that we believe that undergoing psychoanalysis can change something, let's not be excessively enthusiastic either, it can somewhat change the subjection each one has to their identifications.

You know that Freud said, "Destiny is the parents". This was his attempt at extracting the individual destiny from the firmament and placing it among family stars, the effect of which is the Oedipical identifications fixated in childhood.

With Lacan we say that identification is not destiny; which also implies certain optimism, a rare thing in this day and age. It is to say that the weight of what Lacan calls the Other, of the mark of the Other, can be twisted during psychoanalysis.

There is then the determination of identifications, but also an unfathomable decision of the subject implied in them, that has consolidated them and based on which the whole existence has been plotted, and from which the subject draws

sense and satisfaction. To say that identification is not destiny also implies a way of understanding the direction of the healing that advances at the rhythm of the fall of identifications. And it is for that reason that the end of analysis is defined by Lacan as crossing the plane of identifications.

Each one of us has made during our lives an interpretation, a reading with which we have built a destiny, and psychoanalysis taken to the end must sift through these footprints that, written on the body and in the Other, have left our encounters with the real, as well as the reading of what we have done with those encounters.

This is what the testimony of the pass is all about. Of this reading that a subject has made, of its oftentimes unbearable effects and of the way in which someone has been able to twist, at least a little, that destiny.

In a few days, on October 9 it will be forty years since J. Lacan proposed to the School, which then was the Freudian School of Paris, to create the Pass device. In spite of the blows and crisis we all know, it is still alive.

I will give brief points to situate the fundamental steps of the analytical path.

1. Going through something of the Father

Analysis had revolved around the symptomatic suffering incarnated in a sensation of menace and of being exposed to fatality, as well as certain stoppings in professional life and immobility of the body. The origin of that symptom was located only during the last analysis: **paralysis** -signifier of childhood horror. Childhood neurosis explained this as an early and intense phobia that had led the subject to see a psychologist at the age of 5. There he would learn something that he would realize only many years later: that the signifier marks the body and is the cause of jouissance. This encounter took place in an institution where children victims of child paralysis were rehabilitated. The phobia left vestiges in an interminable series of obsessive symptoms and the menacing idea of catching a disabling disease; and he also kept a long lasting interpretation of the mother's wish: *she wants me sick*.

The love for the Father and the jouissance of the Father are connected to the symptom when menace and exposure to fatality become present in the transference. We can then situate the multiple ways in which the subject had taken charge both of the suffering of the Other and of the jouissance of the Other during his life. The love for the Father seemed to include this sacrifice.

Taking care of the Other organized the position it had in the ideal, it gave new meaning to the story of the efforts made and it had been quite effective in giving me a place in professional life, which can be very useful but not recommended for a psychoanalyst.

When already near the end of the analysis the essential of the fantasy was revealed, what I called in the Pass “*the altruistic tale*”, it would reveal itself precisely as what it was: a tale, the tale of the love for the Other, which would find its reverse in the most real of drives.

The name of the Father echoed the name of the analyst, but also the jouissance of the ripper: I recognize then in analysis that my father in his collapse was a fool who ruined his life with self-torture. He wasn't Jack the ripper, but the ripper.

The analyst ends the session and says as I leave: “*Bull's eye!*”. I go out moved and stroll through the city for a long while, purposelessly, until I go for dinner at a restaurant right across from the Pantheon. The Pantheon of the great dead men. A sudden and brief episode of suffocation that anguishes and is accompanied by pain in my chest leaves me the evidence that I have crossed some of the Father.

The two blows: S1 + a

A very early childhood memory situates the encounter between the body and the word of the mother.

The memory takes place in elementary school and has sharp edges: there was a hallway under the staircase, a dark tunnel through which the children had to pass. I am certain that something sexual happened there... something was seen, heard, touched? The memory does not go so far. The boy exits the tunnel all exited, climbs up the staircase at a run and when he reaches the top he collapses. The essential of the memory is that the mother would later say that it was **a heart murmur (In Spanish *soplo*¹ al corazon; in English *heart murmur*)**.

At the end of the tale during analysis I get an interpretation: the *words of your mother penetrated!!!*

Sexual arousal, the collapse of the subject and the death threat are combined with the traumatizing maternal words. The maternal words touch the body, marking a destiny for any excess, excitement, or effort. It also marks certain vulnerability of the body that will be confronted with all the resources of overcompensation that obsession could offer. It leaves the footprint of this saying and the signifier **murmur [soplo]** marking the body.

This first *murmur* is unequivocal in its effects of jouissance, although the child could never know that it was a *heart murmur*. It would then have a destiny of equivocation as a result of the interpretation made by the subject.

¹ T.N.: the word *soplo* in Spanish can be translated, depending on the context as murmur, blow, breath

The interpretation of the analyst begins to draw from the body the *pathos* that the word of the mother had introduced. This is were the position of jouissance from which the subject did nothing but read the signs that announced its connection with fatality stumbles, of what his anxiety with respect to the desire Other was an unequivocal signal.

After *murmur*, a dream. *In the dream: I show the analyst a written report of some medical tests I have taken. The report contains a terrible announcement. The analyst (in my dream) reads it and says: what's written there is not correct. End of the dream.*

When I recount it in the next session I say: -in my dream you tell me that what's written there does not have the value I have given it. Or that what's written there is not mine.

The analyst goes into one of his silences, he stops talking and after a little while he whispers in such a small voice that I have to make an effort not to lose the thread of his speech: - *It ...is...not yours.*

End of session

After that a decisive shift takes place concerning the symptom. The interpretation shows the *reading that the subject continued attributing a mortifying desire to the Other*. The conclusion is that if what's written is not mine, however the reading is, and therefore I will have to take charge of this reading and of the jouissance drawn from it.

The interpellation separates the fatality, both of the name and of what's written, in the Other and supposedly destined to the subject, and indicates the place of the jouissance included in the same reading. The consequences of this reading that fixated both the *pathos* of the identification as well as the symptomatic jouissance will remain entirely on my side.

The relief is striking. Something essential of the burden of the mortification has been lifted.

The logical moment of the pass: the second murmur [soplo]

Although I am immediately asked how to end the analysis, two more years would be necessary to allow me to move away from what I was holding on to and to cross the shocking evidence that the Other is a hole, before finding, as J. Lacan says: "the good hole through which to come out".

At the end of the last session of a series and after telling my analyst that I couldn't find a way out, and that he was going to have to listen to me a little bit more, I bought a beautiful book of Chinese calligraphy. I had always felt attracted

by this aesthetics that shows how letters are divorced from the senses, and I was not indifferent to the fact that it was a book by Francois Cheng, for his relationship with Lacan. I bought the book, I put it in my suitcase and I went on a trip.

The title of the book contains a word whose translation I did not know, it was a word in French that for me had only a culinary sound, and which remained unknown until one day when, already in Buenos Aires, I looked it up in the dictionary, and then the translation hit me. The title of the book was: *Et le souffle devient signe*.

Souffle: breath.

Immediately a memory precipitates the construction of the fantasy. It is the memory of an episode in the life of my Father, who in his childhood almost died of a pulmonary disease and who, in order to recover the use of his lungs had to blow into the chamber of a football.

To be the breath that the Father lacked. The formula identifies the being of the subject and defines the object.

This second *breath* shows how the logic of the Name of the Father retook that first *breath*, a footprint written in the body. To encourage the Other, to blow in hole of the Other was the matrix of the fantasy that I could then build.

One memory almost showed it to the letter: when the father took a nap the child would lie next to him, attentive to his breathing, in a game where he tried to synchronize his breathing to that of his father, always vigilant that it did not stop.

To be the breath of the father is the side name of the father, of that which penetrated in the body through the word of the mother.

Illuminating the fantasy would then situate the “I am that” in a blunt manner. But it also showed that in addition to the determination of this identification, there had been an unfathomable decision of the subject that became evident then. A decision: to be that breath, had given consistency to this identification of which meaning – all the meaning possible- and satisfaction had been drawn. It became then completely evident how an entire existence had been plotted from this decision.

What I have just described is the logical moment of the pass. It is the moment when, in a flash you catch the fantasy framework that had until then sustained all the significations of one life. In that moment we perceive this construction of the fantasy and at the same time this fantasy solution is eclipsed, loses its value, falls.

That where the subject, without knowing, affirmed his being falls and one is left in a bind similar to the one described by Lacan that has a fish with an apple; it does not know what to do with it.

To be the breath that the Other lacked... on the one hand we have situated the place where the being of the subject was sustained, but at the same time we can see the dimension of the object that is now situated: breath.

We see then how the neurotic solution of the subject was built around of the signifier breath that now is unfolded. The first *breath* “footprint written in the body by the word of the mother”, corporization of the signifier that is the matrix of the symptom and the background of the enigma of the desire of the Other and the second *breath* articulated to the Father, which allowed the metaphorical replacement of the DM.

A *breath*, to put it this way, on the side of the symptom, the other *breath* on the side of the fantasy.

Breath 1 → Breath 2

DM ←←← NP

Symptom fantasy

S1 + a

It's a limit point in the analytical experience. It is the limit point where a field that is beyond the Oedipus begins. Breath 1 signifier enters the body through the word of the mother and breath 2 linked to the Name-of-the-Father are the source of the meaning and the signification. Now, after crossing this, the ties to the Other, to knowledge, to the Other sex, to the partner and to the analyst will be redefined. There, the subject is no longer represented and the Other is a hole where the path of the drive will be articulated.

This path would reveal a circuit between keeping quiet and being heard and certain proximity between the respiration (the breath) and the voice. The object then slips from the breath and the word supported by the respiration that goes through and on the other side the muting that closes the mouth in the jouissance of the drive around the vacuum of which the voice resounds. This is how I can situate today, very briefly, the statute of object *a* in my case, that is found in this limit between the body and the Other, between the sonority and the sense.

2. A pass symptom and a dream

This logical moment of the pass ends with a pass symptom and a dream.

The symptom was fleeting, but quite worrisome. It was an acute difficulty in understanding what I was hearing, a sort of *sensitive or receptive aphasia*. I could hear, but sometimes I could not understand. You can imagine the repercussions of such a deficit. The exaggerated worry caused at that moment by the fact that a small and very close child could not completely master the language, led me to decipher this symptom and contributed to its dilution much more than consultations with specialists. It wasn't a loss of hearing but of the critical limit between the sense and the absence of sense, between the sonority and the sense, which presented itself symptomatically. It had its problematic and disquieting side, but it was also funny, when I perceived that I did not understand well especially when the person speaking was a woman.

In turn, the dream was a dream that alludes to logic, to language and to the job of reduction of the unconscious:

"I have to take a Latin test. the words can be clearly seen written in a page, but I don't know what they mean or what I am expected to do with them". It is a disconcerting dream because I never learned Latin and however I am compelled to take this test.

It was only recently with the device of the pass that I could better understand the question. Indeed, the Latin test is the analysis, but the analysis insofar as it reduces the fundamental signifier of the subject to a senseless registry. And on the other hand it shows the position of disconcert in which I found myself, on the edge of the end, against those senseless signifiers already reduced by the work of the unconscious.

In another part of this dream, as the symptom I recently mentioned, shows the ultimate resistance, or in other words the primary and autoerotic rejection of the Other, the language of the Other, the heterogeneity which dissolves in the kingdom of *object a*.

This also shows the limit of what can be drawn from the signifier. And what is drawn from there is the object: *breath, voice* which will no longer be left in the hands of the Other, that the subject will rather take with it without sacrificing the cause of its desire to the Other.

It is the limit of the Freudian unconscious, of the deciphering and of the history.

During the stretch that goes from the end of the analysis to the Pass, a stretch that I will not mention today, we confirm the installation of a new regimen of satisfaction, already outside the fantasy where otherwise the object of the drive and the real that is isolated would become entwined, as well as the Other and the partner.

The final reduction of the symptom to a sign introduced there a certain displacement that implies not being left at the mercy of the hole that opens in front of the inexistence of the Other. This implies recovering and using the object and the symptom in another way and to keep a certain distance from the symptom reduced to a sign, which is left at the end. What is left is the writing of those fragments of real and another use of the blow. Which I could write as follows:

Blow = symptom

The pass and the unforeseen

As I said at the beginning about that research regarding the influence of the temperature of a cup of coffee on human destinies...I would like to conclude by telling you one dream that has to do with math and which I had shortly before I had to show up for Pass, that is, shortly before I met those who would be the passers, that is, those two colleagues that heard my testimony and then passed it to the jury of the pass.

The pass is an evaluation device, but it also introduces an incalculable element and cannot be subjected to rules. On the contrary, the pass introduces a testing element not on the side of the rule but on the side of the exception.

I was saying recently that with the pass one can never be sure of what will happen or what we can expect from it. A dear Catalan colleague, Miquel Bassols² has demonstrated it very lucidly by comparing the pass with the number Pi. Pi, reminded Bassols, *is the real number 3,1416... which is burdened -as we know- by the most terrible uncertainties.*

It is an example of what in intuitivist logic is known as "a lawless series" because one cannot predict which number will follow the last number calculated. It is a structurally unpredictable series, whose law is not given beforehand".

If indeed at the end of the analysis and the Pass we touch a fragment of real, its new inscription will always be an unforeseen event. The experience of the pass opens up this lawless series into the post analytic.

I will now use this reference to the pass and math to situate what my position was as passer at the time of making the pass.

As I waited for the date to travel and was trying to put some order into what I was trying to convey, I had a dream.

² Miquel Bassols, El Porvenir del Pase

I have to take a test. Worried, I look at my notes. These are texts that I read once but I have no recollection of their contents. However, I make up my mind: I go and present myself, I tell myself, I'll manage somehow. I go take the test and halfway there I realize with a start that the test I have to take is a math test. I wake up startled.

One quickly understands that this startled waking places some of my own -not very happy- story with math, which appeared at that special edge. It also shows that the next encounter with the passers and the subsequent intervention of the cartel took the place of the test for which I had to prepare myself, study, retain, repeat, etc. etc. Some of this uncertainty caused the dream. This is one side of the question; let's say the easiest to understand, given the circumstances.

However, the dream shows something more structural. It shows the position of the passer who is going to present its PI number, to which it has arrived by reducing his symptom to a sign.

The "math test" of the dream is then the Pass itself, but it is also the position in which the subject is left against a senseless reality with which it has to do something.

The decision of presenting oneself for the pass gives the dream a justified testing scenario.

In a math test one has to use knowledge, a knowledge that gives no effect of sense but which gives a result. And for me, this result had always been "wrong". I mean that I could never master math with the assurance with which I have been able to face other tests of knowledge and sense. Math was always something of a chance for me, and that is the height of the sense.

And for that reason math served in my dream as precious and paradoxical metaphor of the situation in which I was about to put myself by going to the Pass. Just like with the math test, nothing could guarantee the result.

Translated by Isabel Aguirre

Log

Reflections on The Fifth Congress of the NLS

“Births of the Transference”

Pam Jespersen 7/16/2007

The New Lacanian School of Psychoanalysis held its Fifth Congress, “Births of the Transference” in Athens, Greece, May 19 and 20, 2007. This Congress was a remarkably well orchestrated event. The Hellenic Society functioned like a community of conductors whose batons interwove a rhythm of enlivened presentations. It has been very difficult to write and somehow put into words the artistic effect of this event.

The reception the evening before the Congress was held in an older part of Athens. Plaka is a series of open air markets and restaurants whose streets intermingled beneath the towering heights of The Acropolis. This luminous structure rose lit above the terrace where we had gathered. Below were excavations of ancient baths and the Tower of the Four Winds.

The Fifth Congress was held at The Megaron, the Athens concert hall built in white marble matching the white buildings and homes on the horizon as far as the eye could see. Athens is truly a city dressed in white.

The Congress was well organized and ran smoothly from the beginning address by Reginald Blancet to the conclusion with Gil Caroz. Pierre-Gilles Gueguen’s “Paradoxes of the Transference,” opened the clinical material with a delineation of the conceptual changes in Lacan. He outlined Lacan’s initial return to Freud with the concept of transference as the love of the father. Lacan pursued many avenues later in his work including the Subject Supposed to Know to the deception inherent in spoken words. Reginald Blancet discussed the “Transitional Space of the Psychoanalytic Transference,” which allows the shift from the desire of the Other to the analysand’s own desire with illumination by the unconscious. Daniel Roy’s “Venus is Born Everyday” illuminated how love is born when the Real escapes into the deception of knowledge with a clear case example.

The afternoon was a series of four simultaneous round table presentations of clinical cases carefully distilled through the excellent experience of the inter-cartels where colleagues could exchange ideas and questions through a series of dialogues. Daniel Roy and Pierre-Gilles Gueguen took on this phenomenal task with great success in the final quality of cases presented. Each case could have been an afternoon discussion in and of itself.

The dinner and dance Saturday evening began with the prolific and beautiful display of well prepared Greek delicacies. The ambience was unique and of course the room was dressed white, luminous in its purity. The dancing went on into the early hours of the morning.

The second day began promptly with the bell for the concert to begin. Again case material was the focus with discussions led by Jean-Pierre Klotz and Alexandre Stevens. Eric Laurent, General Delegate of the World Association of Psychoanalysis, delivered a concise, passionate summary of the multiple forms of the transference. He introduced the Object a as the space, empty as such, that the analyst occupies which allows access through the transference to the real. Whenever I have heard this man speak, I am struck by his dedication to deliver something beyond words. Captivated by his presentation, listening to him is always a delight.

The afternoon began with the presence of Judith Miller and Dominique Holvoet chairing two case examples of the transference in the clinics of the CPCT. Judith Miller emphasized that the clinic must reflect the social environment we live in and work to receive people in the moment. Philippe Stasse then chaired a discussion of several cases of shorter treatments within the CPCT. These cases illustrated that the analysand must want to know something of their own desire.

To conclude, the next Congress will occur in Ghent Belgium under the direction of Anne Lysy, March 15-16, 2008, with the work centering on the "The Body and the Objects in the Psychoanalytic Clinic." It is a logical extension of the experience in Athens on the "Births of the Transference." Something unspeakable is produced in an analysis. The body with its inherent division can only be approached through speech. Literally how does one speak of a birth? How does one speak of the thing produced, the Object a? We shall hear, see and all of us experience Ghent, Belgium in our own unique way. My transference to Athens will always be the "city dressed in white," whose passionate dance was felt throughout this eloquent Congress. Thank you to the Hellenic Society.

Log

Births of Transference

Tracy Favre and Dinorah Otero

The Fifth Congress of the New Lacanian School took place in Athens at its magnificent Music Hall, the Megaron, on May 19-20, 2007. Births of transference and more precisely the installation and the handling of the Psychoanalytic transference oriented the work during those two days but also during the year among Cartels. As new attendees of the NLS, this gave us the opportunity to grasp Freud's birth of transference -as related to knowledge and love- and how Lacan later articulated transference in the analytic experience – pointing at knowledge and Jouissance. In his reformulation of transference Lacan sets the real- an impossible to say- at its core.

Freud's Birth of transference. Knowledge and love.

Pierre-Gilles Gueguen, in the opening remarks, discussed the plurality and multiplicity implied in the births of transference, reminding the paradoxes in these births as well as the concept in itself. He described transference as “a deception here and now”. It is in 1895, in *Studies on Hysteria*, that Freud introduced transference as a false connection and described it as deceitful. Anna O.'s treatment by Breuer surprised Freud by the intensity of her affective reaction onto the doctor. Thus love transference emerged as a spontaneous phenomenon that intrigued Freud and Dora's case gave him the opportunity to emphasize the emergence of transference as a necessity during the cure.

In Dora's treatment, Freud defines transferences as “new editions or facsimiles of the tendencies and fantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, (...), that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician.”¹ Initially transference emerged as an obstacle in the cure: it appeared as a resistance, a defense for the free association. Paradoxically, Freud later saw transference as a necessary tool in the cure: “on the one hand an instrument of irreplaceable value and on the other hand a source of serious dangers.”²

According to Freud, transference allows one to have access to repressed material. The analytic situation with the support of transference supposes a subject of the unconscious and it is through interpretation that the patient can know about it. Gil Caroz emphasizes that “for Freud the love of transference only has a sense inasmuch as it is articulated, in one way or another, to the elaboration of an unconscious knowledge.”³

¹ S. Freud, *Dora: An Analysis of a case of Hysteria*, Macmillan Publishing Co., p.138.

² S. Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Norton and Co., p.52.

³ G Caroz, “Knowledge and presence in psychoanalytic transference”, *Bulletin of the NLS*, Number 1, 2007, p. 17.

Guy Trobas in his lecture on Freud's discovery of transference referred to it as a contingency and opened the question to Dora's non-answered demand of love: should Freud have answered her demand? For Freud two aspects of transference are linked: love and knowledge. Freud's desire in the cure, as Lieve Billiet underscores, "is the desire of the father".⁴ Freud believes that the love of the father is the condition of the psychoanalytical treatment: because of love, knowledge cures.

From Freud to Lacan

The first time that Lacan writes about transference is in *Intervention on transference* in 1951 where he discusses Dora's case and Freud's struggle in handling the transference. Lacan is interested in Dora's case because of "what it stands for in the experience of transference when this experience was still new, this being the first case in which Freud recognized that the analyst played his part"⁵. He examines –in dialectic terms- transference and the operation of the analyst who interprets it, and discusses Freud's resistance –counter-transference- that is described as "the prejudices, passions, and difficulties of the analyst."⁶ An example of his resistance is with the Oedipal Complex, in which he defines the predominance of the paternal figure as natural rather than normative. Lacan states that even after the interruption of the treatment, Freud continues insisting on the triumph of love. Thus Lacan reformulated the concept of transference going beyond the semblant of love: "transference does not arise from any mysterious property of affectivity, and even when it reveals an emotive aspect, this only has meaning as a function of the dialectical moment in which it occurs."

Francois Leguil talked about two loves: one love that arises with the Other of knowledge and one love that holds its value only from the real that escapes him. Lacan, in Seminar VIII, relates transference to a metaphor of love. Through the Banquet, Lacan gave birth to his concept of agalma with Socrates' refusal in reciprocating Alcibiades' love. This object appears as a transformation of the lack in being, its essence is from the order of the void, the nothingness. For Lacan there is no reciprocity of love in the analytic experience, which makes the analyst agalmatic. As Eric Laurent pointed out, the analyst will face the analysand's identifications and it is by not answering that the analyst becomes the empty point, an undifferentiated object that will provide a place for the text to be written. Lacan mentions the deceiving aspect of transference: interpreting the transference is "nothing other than a ruse to fill in the emptiness of this deadlock.

⁴ L. Billiet, Transference at the time of Freud and today: the deadlocks of love and the logic of the market, Bulletin of the NLS, Number 1, 2007, p. 31.

⁵ J. Lacan, *Intervention on Transference*, Feminine Sexuality, Norton & Co., p. 64.

⁶ *Ibid*, p.71.

But while it may be deceptive, this ruse serves a purpose by setting off the whole process again.”⁸

For Jean-Pierre Klotz the Subject supposed to Know marks the denunciation of the semblants. In transference it is a rapport between love and drive, a dimension of pacification of the father, which opens the dimension of jouissance.

Lacan’s Birth of Transference: Knowledge and Jouissance.

Beginning of transference is the subject’s supposition that there is something to know: “transference is unthinkable unless one sets out from the subject who is supposed to know.”⁹ The patient’s suffering becomes an analytic symptom when it represents an enigmatic knowledge for the analysand, who supposes the analyst to know how to decipher it. Transference is no longer reduced to love-its imaginary aspect- but the Subject supposed to Know implies a new conceptualization of transference: its symbolic dimension.

Transference is described as a phenomenon bound up with a nodal desire: it is the patient’s desire in its meeting with the analyst’s desire. Transference is not a relation between subjects but a relation between signifiers. It is in the *Proposition of October 1967* that Lacan presents the algorithm of transference as a relation between signifiers: “the first one being the signifier of the symptom, (...), the second one being the place where the analyst is situated.”¹⁰ Eric Laurent explained that the signifier that represents the analyst becomes undetermined and can be invented.

Lacan also refers to transference as related to the object a. In Seminar VIII, the analyst appears in the place of the agalma. According to Eric Laurent the analyst comes to the place of the object that is always already lost. The analyst becomes the partenaire or partner symptom of the subject. The symptom holds together the chain that articulates itself and the operation of designation is the fundamental baptism of the object: something comes to be named, it is a named jouissance. Patrick Monribot examines the function of the symptom as a way of treating the unbearable jouissance. Through the experience of analysis, the subject must invent a new symptom that can assure the knotting of the real, the symbolic and the imaginary. This will link language and body.

The presence of the analyst is necessary and is a manifestation of the unconscious. There is an effect of surprise that emerges in the chain of signifiers. Because the unconscious is the discourse of the Other, the analyst’s interpretation can have an effect and help a subject to produce his text. In

⁸ Ibid, p.71.

⁹ J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, p. 253.

¹⁰ L. Billiet, Transference at the time of Freud and today: the deadlocks of love and the logic of the market, Bulletin of the NLS, Number 1, 2007, p.33

Lacanian Compass

Seminar XI Lacan's definition of transference implies a differentiation between repetition and transference, raising it on its real dimension: "the enactment of the reality of the unconscious"¹¹. Transference gives us access to the reality of the unconscious, which is sexual reality: "love is the denial of this real"¹². Therefore, what is at stake in the analytic experience is what escapes knowledge, the real.

Transference is a paradoxical concept that is either an obstacle or a possibility appears as a deceived love but it enables the access to the sexual reality of the unconscious. This Congress- through both the theoretical aspect and the case presentations- made us question this crucial phenomenon in our own experience in the United States. Working in an Outpatient Clinic or a Continuing Day Treatment Program, we are driven by the medical model which goal, through efficiency and cost-efficacy, is to eliminate symptoms with a treatment plan pre-establishing the steps and objectives in a pre-determined time. Where one suppresses symptoms Lacan reminds us that "putting the symptom to work" –in the case by case- allows the emergence of the subject. We wonder what is the place of the transference within this model? What is the therapist's desire, who seems to apply an empirical based method? This leaves open questions regarding our own responsibility within this context and our awareness to create a demand of treatment for our patients. This "handling of the transference" is opposed to Lacan's teaching. Didn't Lacan situate the analyst in the position of the object a?

¹¹ J. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, p. 149.

¹² L. Billiet. Transference at the time of Freud and today: the deadlocks of love and the logic of the market, Bulletin of the NLS, Number 1, 2007, p.33.

Log

The Variety of the Practice.

Questions on Classification.

Dinorah Otero

The Third American Encounter, XV International Encounter of the Freudian Field, held in Belo Horizonte on August 3, 4 and 5 was entitled “The variety of the practice, from the clinical type to the unique case in psychoanalysis”. The Encounter was characterized by an environment of intense work around topics such as the unclassified cases, emergence of new symptoms, clinical types and the singularity of each case, and the presence of the analyst in new mental health centers. The contemporary clinical practice leads us to search for new responses, many times inventing them.

From the variety of presentations and debates I will sketch only a few ideas regarding questions on classification in the clinical practice nowadays: Why are there so many cases that seem to resist the structural classification of neurosis and psychosis? Does it continue to be useful the classification between psychosis and neurosis? Does the class of “the unclassifiable” exist?

Why is there a proliferation of the unclassifiable cases? In answering his own question, Juan F. Perez talked about the proliferation of the unclassifiable cases from a historical perspective. He understands this proliferation as a trait of the era of the Other who does not exist. Jacques-Alain Miller states that the inexistence of the Other, “rivets the subject to the pursuit of surplus-jouissance.”³. In terms of E. Laurent, this era is characterized by “the rise of object a to the zenith of the social”⁴. Silvia Tendlarz, in her article *Lo inclasificable*⁵, notices that the modality of presentation of the clinical cases has changed as related to the decline of the Ideal and the predominance of the object a over the Ideal that leads to a pluralization of the S1. She also discusses on a proliferation of atypical cases that may be related to subjects that seek to compensate a symbolic deficit through imaginary identifications, which would work as a *suppleance*.

J. F. Perez warned us of the misunderstanding of situating as “ordinary psychosis” to every unclassifiable case. Regarding this matter he opened up a

³ J.-A. Miller & E. Laurent, The Other who does not exist and his ethical committees, *Almanac of Psychoanalysis*. Psychoanalytic stories after Freud and Lacan, p.26.

⁴ *Ibid*, p.30.

⁵ S. E. Tendlarz, *Lo inclasificable*, La variedad de la practica, del tipo clinico al caso unico en psicoanalisis, 2007, p.31.

debate generating an enriching dialogue with Eric Laurent who underscored that the “ordinary psychosis” is a program of investigation.

Is the classification of neurosis and psychosis still useful? This question would summarize the debates of some of the workshops in which doubts about the use of the classification between neurosis and psychosis emerged. Alicia Arenas⁶ reminds us the “Conversation of Arcachon” in which J.-A. Miller identifies two moments in the clinic, a nominalist one, in which the patient is seen in his singularity, and a structural moment related to types of symptoms and structure. Throughout discussions in the workshops I attended I noticed a consensus in thinking that the current challenges in diagnosing and the emphasis in considering the singularity of each case do not prevent us from making a diagnosis regarding the structure. The differentiation between neurosis and psychosis allows us to orient the direction of the cure.

However it seems that the cases that resist all attempts of classification come to question the clinic of structure, which is oriented by the Name of the Father and belongs to the first period in Lacan’s teaching. The clinic of a second period related to the sinthome would provide a useful compass in the practice. It is “based on the topology of the Borromean knot, which seeks to grasp the singularity at stake in each subject’s relation to language and jouissance.”⁷ It is within the clinic of the sinthome that E. Laurent proposed the construction of mathemes. P. Lacadee tells us that the Borromean clinic does not replace but is “supplementary” to the clinic of the structure: “it allows for the knotting of the universal of structure and the singular trait of the subject.”⁸

I will finish with a question that came up during R. Barros’ presentation: does the unclassifiable exist? He talked about the unclassified as the real impossible to be named. Eric Laurent concluded that the real unclassified is the object a. With this affirmation he provided an orientation of the intervention of the analyst. The interpretation in analysis points at the object a in order to translate the more singular of the subject that is his untranslatable jouissance.

⁶ A. Arenas, Tipo clinico y caso unico, conceptos que no se recubren, La variedad de la practica, del tipo clinico al caso unico, pp. 64-65.

⁷ P. Dravers, Editorial, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, Issue 13, May 2005.

⁸ P. Lacadee, The singularity of a psychic reality. Psychoanalysis applied to a case of ordinary psychosis, Psychoanalytical Notebooks, Issue 15, September 2006, p.171.

CHART

Houston, TX

Adherent to the Freudian Field Library

<http://www.wapol.org/en/campo/campo.asp>

Library address: 12026 Canterhurst Way. Houston Tx.77065

SCHEDULE: Open Second and fourth Wednesday of each month,

Hours: 12:30-2:00 pm. by appointment. Information Telefax: +(281) 897 8295

Responsible:

Carmen Navarro Niño.

AP. Member of World Association of Psychoanalysis (WAP)

e-mail: CarmenNavarro11@hotmail.com

On-Going Activities: Fall 2007

1. 2007 Reading Circle: Carmen Navarro Nino, Marianela Bermudez.

Readings from Jacques-Alain Miller 2004-2005, *Pieces detaches* (Detached pieces)

Activities on Wednesday. Frequency: weekly 12:30pm-2:00pm

Free admission. Address: 12026 Canterhurst Way HoustonTx.77065

2. Seminar "The Identification from Freud to Lacan":

Responsible: Mercedes Acuña.

Previous lecture and discussion.

Free admission

Contact: Tel: 713-852-7721.

E-mail: mecheacuna@yahoo.com.ar

3. Lectures at the Diagonal. Fairbanks Center: Carmen Navarro Nino.

Selected readings. From Jacques Lacan, J. A Miller, Eric Laurent, Robert and Rosine Lefort, Sigmund Freud and others

The Lacanian Orientation Circle of Houston

Readings on Psychoanalysis with cultural and clinical connections. Every other Thursday, from 5:30 to 6:45 p.m. Bilingual English Spanish meetings.

Discussant: Carmen Navarro Nino, Analyst AP. Member AMP World Association of Psychoanalysis.

4. Cartels activities scheduled by group's agreement.

Information L Nino: Tel: 713 823 9375

Lacanian Compass

Academic Lecture coordinators: Marianela Bermudez and Luis F Nino.

Address: Fairbanks Center- Cy-Fair College. At Diagonal 290

14955 North freeway HOUSTON Texas 77040

Room 201 (the conference room) upstairs.

DATES:

August: 16th and 30th -September: 13th and 27th-.October: 11th and 25th.

November: 8th and 15th- December: 6th and 13th.

Bibliography:

1. 1901.Lacan's 'Ecrits .: ECRITS originally published in French by Editions Seuil 1966. Reading from The first complete Edition in English 2005, and
2. Jacques Lacan Escritos 1 - 2 Spanish Edition. Mexico 1995
3. J-A Miller. -Recorrido de Lacan. Manantial. Argentina 199
4. AMP-WAP –selection -Florilegios and unclassifiable. Argentina 1995
5. Eric Laurent. SIETE PROBLEMAS DE LOGICA COLECTIVA...Madrid 1996. IMAGINARIO Y LOGICA COLECTIVA. EOLIA.

Miami, Florida

The Lacanian School of Miami and the Florida Center for Teaching and Research

Fall activities:

Institute

Fundamentals 2 : On Mondays starting on September, Reading Seminar XI, J.Lacan

Responsible: Faculty of the Institute

Research Seminar: How to Investigate in Psychoanalysis.

(First Conference dictated by Leonardo Gorostiza virtually from Buenos Aires).

Responsibles: Faculty of the Institute

Research Seminar: Autism.

Exploration of the relationship between body and language. Autism and the Other. Position of the analyst in Autism

Responsible: Alicia Arenas, Juan Felipe Arango

Research Seminar: Adolescence, The Teen-agers

What is the relationship between post- modernism and adolescence. What is the relationship between the Law, Technology, affects and adolescents.

Responsible: Juan Felipe Arango

Research Seminar: On Transference

One of the fundamental concepts and tools of Psychoanalysis and its use in the direction of the cure.

Responsible: Fernando Schutts

School Nights

Seminar: The objects of Psychoanalysis.

Tracing the concept of "object" from Freud and Lacan's work

Responsible: Alicia Arenas

Special Events:

September 8, 2007 : "Testimony of the pass" by Mauricio Tarrab

September, 2007 : Clinical days with the presence of Ricardo Nepomiachi , Analyst from Buenos Aires

Clinical cases will be presented and discussed by the Nel-Miami

November , 2007: Presentation by a Brazilian Psychoanalyst, Angelina Harari on "Addictions"

Contact:

NELFLORIDA@aol.com

Tel/fax: (305) 461-0999

New York, NY

Lacanian Ink

Responsible: Josefina Ayerza

These are the Lacanian Ink events related with the launching of LI 30 (Fall 2007) which continues Jacques-Alain Miller's reading on Jacques Lacan's Seminar "From an Other to the other" (D'un Autre à l'autre).

Alain Badiou at Tilton Gallery - NYC - on Wednesday November 14 and at Miguel Abreu Gallery - NYC - on Friday November 16 2007.

Slavoj Zizek at Tilton Gallery - NYC - on Tuesday November 27 2007.

All events start at 7 pm and the admission is free.

The writers included in the issue are:

Jacques-Alain Miller, Alain Badiou, Simon Critchley, Massimo Recalcati, Jean-Luc Nancy, Slavoj Zizek, Josefina Ayerza

New York Freud Lacan Analytic Group

Responsible: Maria Cristina Aguirre

Contact: nyflag@yahoo.ca

Reading Seminar:

Lacanian Compass

We will continue reading and studying Seminar XX by Jacques Lacan. We will also refer to the NLS London Seminar on Love and Knowledge and other texts by Jacques-Alain Miller, and others. Every other Wednesday, beginning September 12, 2007.

Clinical Seminar:

Research and discussion of Clinical cases. Every other Wednesday beginning September 19, 2007

Barnard College, Room 407, Broadway at 117th St. NYC

Special Events this Fall

Testimony of the Pass

For the first time in New York, we will have the opportunity to hear a recently nominated Analyst of the School (A.E.) give a testimony of the Pass.

Mauricio Tarrab, Argentinean Psychoanalyst, is a member of the EOL and has been secretary of the WAP (World Association of Psychoanalysis) from 2002 to 2006.

He received the nomination of A.E. in 2006.

You can read his first testimony in the web pages of the W.A.P.

September 5, 2007, 8 pm.

Barnard College, NYC

13th International Seminar of the Freudian Field

with Jean-Pierre Klotz, French Psychoanalyst, member of the Board of the Ecole de la Cause Freudienne (E.C.F.), and also past-president of the ECF.

Dr. Klotz has come several times to the US to give Seminars in New York, Omaha, Miami, Kent, and Columbia.

Lecture: About Transference: singularities in the world of globalization.

Friday October 26 2007, 8 pm.

Fordham College, NYC

Seminar: Uses of Transference in the Analytic Experience.

Saturday October 27 2007, 9 am to 7 pm.

Fordham College, NYC

Omaha, Nebraska

Circle for the Lacanian Orientation of Omaha

Seminar on "The Body as Object"

We take as a theme "The Body as Object." Within our work on this, we will explore the process through which the body becomes--as we say in the United States--objectified, the process by

which meaning and sense is made of the body, as the body--any body--is made an object by a subject. The social determinations of this have changed dramatically through time, which we will explore, as well as the effects of this process on the psyche and the ways in which the body--through the object--is linked to a person's symptom and suffering.

As part of this work, we will take up the psychoanalytic notion of the drive (or instinctual) object, as first formulated by Freud, and we will pay especially close attention to Lacan's object a, his reformulation of the Freudian part objects (oral, anal, phallic)--extended as well to the voice and the gaze, and beyond.

Beginning in the Fall, we will have presentations and discussions on a series of talks given by Lacan in his Seminar X on "Anguish" in 1963, talks that introduce the object a and detail its application in clinical practice. (Chapters 16 through 24 of Lacan's Seminar X will be suggested, though not required, reading. An English translation is available at Karnac Books at <http://www.karnacbooks.com/>.)

Monthly meetings on Fridays at 11:00-12:30. Contact Thomas Svolos for further information on specific dates and location.

"The Forms of the Social Bond"--Reading Seminar XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis

In addition to the Seminar on "The Body as Object," CLOO will be sponsoring a reading group this year. We will be reading Seminar XVII of Jacques Lacan, which has just been released in a superb translation by Russell Grigg. The Seminar is titled The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, published by Norton.

All are welcome to attend this Reading Group--no prior familiarity with psychoanalysis, prior participation in the Reading Group, or reading is necessary to participate.

Monthly meetings on Fridays at 11:00-12:30. Contact Thomas Svolos for further information on specific dates and location

Sentinel

Lacanian–Orientation–US National and International Activities

2007

Oct 6–7	Paris, France	36 th Journées d'Études de l'ECF: "Notre Sujet Supposé Savoir"
Oct 26–27	New York, New York	13th International Seminar of the Freudian Field, with J.-P. Klotz: "Uses of Transference in the Analytic Experience"

2008

Mar 15–16	Ghent, Belgium	6 th Congress of the NLS: "The Body and Its Objects in the Psychoanalytic Clinic"
Mar 29–30	Miami, Florida	Seminar with Alexandre Stevens: Autism
Mar 29–30	Paris, France	Forums des psys
Apr 21–25	Buenos Aires, Argentina	6 th Congress of the World Association of Psychoanalysis: "the Objects <i>a</i> in the Psychoanalytic Experience"
Jun 7–8	Omaha, Nebraska	Clinical Study Days 3: "The Object of Psychoanalysis"

KEY

Events in the United States

Events of the New Lacanian School

Events of the Nueva Escuela Lacaniana

Events of the École de la Cause freudienne

Events of the World Association of Psychoanalysis

Other Events

Resources in Lacanian Psychoanalysis

The World Association of Psychoanalysis:

The aim of the World Association of Psychoanalysis is to promote the practice and the study of psychoanalysis following the teachings of Jacques Lacan. It was created by Jacques-Alain Miller in February 1992 and today has over a thousand members in Europe, America and Australia. The WAP creates Schools that develop and transmit psychoanalysis, ensure the formation of analysts, found their qualification and guarantee the quality of their practice. The World Association of Psychoanalysis holds a Scientific Congress and an Assembly of members every two years. It works in coordination with the Foundation of the Freudian Field and the Institute of the Freudian Field, sharing the responsibility for submitting psychoanalysis to regular criticism of its fundamentals and of its role in today's world. Information on the WAP--its activities and publications--can be found on the WAP website:

<http://www.wapol.org/en/index.html>

New Lacanian School:

NLS is the English-language School of the WAP. Information on the constituent societies and groups, as well as events and publications can be found at

<http://www.amp-nls.org/>

New York Freud Lacan Analytic Group:

NYFLAG sponsors regular activities in New York as well as Seminars and other special programs with visiting psychoanalysts. For more information or to get on the mailing list, contact Maria Cristina Aguirre at nyflag@yahoo.ca.

NEL-Miami:

These groups sponsor regular activities and special programs in Florida in English and Spanish. For additional information, contact Nelflorida@aol.com.

Lacan.com:

Online resources on Lacanian psychoanalysis:

<http://www.lacan.com/>

Information Listserves--

Lacanian-Orientation-US: The Information Listserve for Clinical Study Days and other programs of the World Association of Psychoanalysis in the United States.

<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Lacanian-Orientation-US/>

English-Language Publications--

Mental (published by NLS; French print journal and English online journal):

<http://www.mental-nls.com/>

Psychoanalytical Notebooks (published by London Society of the NLS; print journal with selected online papers):

<http://www.londonsociety-nls.org.uk/Welcome.htm>

Almanac of Psychoanalysis (published by the Israel Society of the NLS; print journal): information available from Yotvat Oxman, Editor, yotvatt@zahav.net.il

Lacanian Compass

International Lacanian Review (online journal published by Jacques-Alain Miller):
<http://www.lacanianreview.com.br>

Lacanian Compass (published by WAP; newsletter of Lacanian activities in the US):
<http://www.wapol.org/es/lacanian/lacanian.asp>

Lacanian Praxis: International Quarterly of Applied Psychoanalysis (online journal published by the WAP):
<http://www.mental-nls.com/>

World Association for Psychoanalysis Letter for Europe (online newsletter of the WAP):
<http://www.amp-europe-lettre.com/>

Journal for Lacanian Studies (paper journal published by Karnac Books; with select online articles):
<http://www.jlsjournal.com/>

Lacanian Ink (paper journal published by Josefina Ayerza; online excerpts):
<http://www.lacan.com/covers.htm>

The Symptom (online journal published by Josefina Ayerza):
<http://www.lacan.com/thesymptom.htm>

(Re)-turn: A Journal of Lacanian Studies:
<http://www.missouri.edu/~raglande/Lacan/>

